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The Sovereign Signifier: Agamben 
and the Nonhuman
Paul Eisenstein
Giorgio Agamben’s invocations of Sovereignty and Law would appear, on 
their face, to vex his relationship to a Lacanian conception of the nonhu-
man. At the heart of this vexed relationship is the seeming fealty Agamben’s 
analyses pay to Michel Foucault. In the Introduction to his Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben writes that in his final years, 
Foucault had appeared to orient his analysis of Power according to ‘two 
distinct directives for research’:
[O]n the one hand, the study of the political techniques (such as the science 
of the police) with which the State assumes and integrates the care of the 
natural life of individuals into its very center; on the other, the examination 
of the technologies of the self by which processes of subjectivization bring the 
individual to bind himself to his own identity and consciousness and, at 
the same time, to an external power.1
To anyone familiar with Foucault’s work, these two directives are hardly 
surprising. Agamben, for his part, appears to accept the basic  two- pronged 
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thesis when it comes to analyzing Power, which is to say that he sees how 
the workings of disciplinary power are inseparable from processes that 
belong to the very advent of subjectivity, and the entire attachment or 
reduction of the body and its sensations to something called an Individual 
Subject.2
To the extent that Agamben has a quarrel with Foucault, it is that the 
latter never names or locates the exact point of intersection in the body 
of Power itself ‘at which techniques of individualization and totalizing 
procedures converge.’3 He likens this place of meeting to ‘a vanishing 
point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault’s inquiry (and, more 
generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward 
without reaching.’4 It is the self-proclaimed achievement of Agamben’s 
work to have reached and rendered visible this vanishing point in the 
figure of the homo sacer—the casualty of a sovereign, legal decision, the 
life that is included in a political order ‘solely in the form of its exclu-
sion.’5 This ‘obscure figure of archaic Roman law’ offers, according to 
Agamben, nothing less than ‘the key by which not only the sacred texts 
of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their 
mysteries.’6
How, and in what way, does the figure of the homo sacer render visible 
the mystery of political Power? The answers provided by Agamben to 
this question are, in a significant way, historicist: Western politics gets 
founded on the exclusion of an exemplar of biological life (the homo 
sacer)—on a sovereign decree that divides human and nonhuman life, 
privileging the former and permitting violence against the latter. The 
homo sacer is precisely the person who can be killed without it being 
considered a crime.7 
In modernity, this fracturing decree takes on a paradoxically doleful 
hue. In antiquity, the homo sacer is distinguished from the rights-bearing 
citizen, relegated to and associated with a form of living that is the abject, 
sacred, denuded substance of life itself; in modernity, however, the ben-
eficiaries of the fracturing decree want that sacredness for their own lives 
and societies as well. Thus, for Agamben, this fracturing decree comes to 
bewitch modern democracies, the citizens of which come to imagine a 
freedom and plenitude in bare life itself, in the organic life of their com-
munity, if only it could be rid of its (ostensible) contaminants.
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Agamben follows Foucault’s theorization of the emergence of ‘bio-
power’ here because it is Foucault who first isolates the way in which 
biological life itself becomes a matter of political concern. For Foucault, 
biological life and its survival was once not something that concerned 
politics. Indeed, what Foucault calls ‘the fact of living’ was a concern that 
appeared only episodically (and apolitically) amid death-producing 
events (e.g., epidemics and famine), events that were understood to fall 
fundamentally outside of human control. As control over the conditions 
of existence grew during the eighteenth century—largely because of 
improved agricultural techniques and also of the rise of scientific disci-
plines that constructed, or even invented, life8—an opportunity emerged 
for human subjects to understand themselves as the bearers of life in a 
living world that could be known and transformed.
The double-valenced opportunity Foucault describes amounts to this: 
It is only life’s respite from the vicissitudes of death that enables its capture 
by biopower, enables it to pass ‘into knowledge’s field of control and 
power’s sphere of intervention.’9 Life becomes the province of the State, 
which has an interest now in the living bodies of its citizens. A vast array 
of disciplines and institutions are developed that produce, articulate, dis-
seminate, and ultimately regulate the truth of life. (Psychoanalysis and 
the psychoanalytic session would be seen to be part of this production/
regulation.) The concept and exercise of Truth itself, as Foucault would 
put it, ‘lays down the law.’10 Biological life and its putative enjoyment 
become the object of political strategies and struggles—the thing of 
unsurpassed value when it comes to politics today.
What unites and explains phenomena as otherwise disparate as Nazism, 
the spectacle-ridden society of late capitalist consumerism, and the War 
on Terror is thus the increased politicization of biological life—the 
attempt to secure and enjoy natural life directly or immediately. The fan-
tasmatic, besieged pleasures of biological existence therefore lie at the 
source of the horrible violence of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
which at times leads Agamben to follow Foucault in calling for a new way 
of conceiving politics altogether—a politics, he says, ‘no longer founded 
on the exceptio of bare life.’11 Only an entirely new way of thinking about 
politics can free one from the way sovereign decisions politicize biological 
life via acts of Law that include life in and through the act of excluding it.
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This relationship of ‘inclusive exclusion’ is, for Agamben, ‘the originary 
form of law.’12 From this Foucauldian standpoint, it would appear that 
there is no way of redeeming Law, or making it somehow fairer or just. It 
is not a question of looking to and overseeing more just incarnations of 
the Lacanian Law, the essence of which is ‘to divide up, distribute, or 
reattribute everything that counts as jouissance.’13 Political struggle is not 
a question of shoring up the Law against its manipulability, of fighting 
for better or more equitable distributions of jouissance, of relocating the 
source of the Law’s emergence in the people as opposed to the Sovereign. 
The implications of the trenchant observations in a book such as Richard 
Rubenstein’s The Cunning of History—that ‘the Nazis committed no 
crime at Auschwitz,’ that ‘no laws were broken and no crimes committed 
at Auschwitz,’ that the ‘Jews were executed in accordance with German 
Law’—are those of someone who believes in the liberal–democratic ver-
sion of Law and in the capacity of a polis to check the Sovereign’s manipu-
lation of it.14
On this view, only better and fairer laws, laws that respect the rights 
and dignity of all people, can create something like a more just and 
humane society. For Foucault, however, the problem is that Law touches 
or appropriates the human and questions of pleasure at all. In a clear evoca-
tion of Foucault, and in a way seemingly at odds with psychoanalysis, 
Agamben calls for a politics ‘beyond every idea of ’ or in ‘relation to’ 
Law.15 This kind of politics stands to change—in the direction of nonap-
propriation and nondomination—the very way we encounter living and 
inanimate beings.16 Collapsing the human–nonhuman distinction frees 
in a radical way both parties from the inclusion–exclusion problematic. 
The nonhuman escapes the violence visited on it by the human, while 
human subjects themselves are afforded the putatively liberating chance—
to invoke the name of Gerard Bruns’s book—to ‘cease to be human.’17
 Which Bare Life?
When Agamben calls for a politics no longer founded on the Law- 
executing exceptio of bare life, we should, however, ask: Which bare life is 
he talking about? This question is pertinent because it seems to me that 
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there are two bare lives in Agamben’s analysis of the exception/exclusions 
created by Law. By this, I mean that there are two distinct sovereignties 
in Agamben’s work.
The first is a sovereignty that happens historically, that exercises its 
powers in ways that marginalize other living creatures. This is a sover-
eignty that need not have exercised its Power in the way that it does. The 
designation of prisoners in the so-called War on Terror as ‘enemy combat-
ants’—and their indefinite detention at Guantánamo, without ever being 
accused of a crime—is one example of this exercise of Sovereignty. The 
second, however, is one that is constitutive—a sovereignty the exercise of 
which, insofar as we live in a properly social world, already has happened. 
This is a sovereignty that is logically necessary. If the first Sovereignty is 
exemplified by actual victims of political violence (e.g., the refugee or 
immigrant, the African-American victim of police violence, the dispos-
able worker), the second has no actuality and no exemplar.
This second sovereignty produces a nonhuman form of life that is nec-
essarily and entirely conceptual, the result of a different sort of Sovereign 
decision, one having to do with the law-bearing function of language 
itself. In his lone reference to Hegel in Homo Sacer, Agamben suggests 
that we have Hegel to thank for letting one see how the primordial 
Sovereign is language itself, because it is only with the advent of language 
that the illusion of something meaningful prior to language appears. We 
experience this advent as undoing the tie to natural biological life but in 
truth there was no prior tie, no subjective experience of it. The logical 
necessity of this dynamic, Agamben writes, makes plain ‘the bond of 
inclusive exclusion to which a thing is subject because of the fact of being 
in language, of being named. To speak is, in this sense, always to “speak 
the law”.’18
The notion that an individual speaking speaks the Law or expresses the 
bond of inclusive–exclusion has its antecedent in Hegel’s critique of 
sense-certainty in The Phenomenology; this book definitively establishes 
the extent to which the immediacy of anything captured by language is 
always already (and necessarily) a vanished immediacy. As Hegel illus-
trates it, actual, discrete particulars ‘cannot be reached by language’: The 
instant someone names or describes a particular thing (e.g., ‘this bit of 
paper’), the absolute particularity of this thing has been replaced by the 
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words used to refer to or describe it.19 One cannot ‘say’ a particular thing 
without the sound of the saying itself becoming a particular thing, for-
saking its referential function—its ability to enable one to think the par-
ticular thing being designated or to grasp how there are many actual, 
discrete particulars.
The phrase ‘this bit of paper,’ after all, can refer to many different bits 
of paper. For Hegel, then, the cognizance or retention of particularity is 
paradoxically inseparable from its sacrifice. The valorized sensuousness of 
the particulars of sensory perception is always a retroactive construction, 
an effect of a nomenclatural foreclosure, which means that whatever we 
are able to designate meaningfully about such details is already the result 
of our having ‘spoken the law.’
Hegel applies this thesis regarding the fantasy of sense-certainty explic-
itly to biological life itself (what he calls ‘mere’ life) in part three of the 
greater Logic, where he makes plain the extent to which any and all invo-
cations of mere life must reckon with the way such life gets cognized. 
Indeed, in the final section of his book, Hegel traces the way cognition 
itself forges and maintains an identity between its own idea of natural life 
and natural life itself even as it announces their diremption. As Hegel sees 
it, philosophy goes farther than sciences (e.g., physics or psychology) 
because these sciences are content to generate or determine general laws 
based on empirical considerations. Philosophy, however, grasps the way 
the Absolute Idea or Absolute Notion clarifies the way the very appear-
ance of empirical entities that are different from thinking is, at the same 
time, unifying.
To recognize this is to have arrived at the Absolute Idea or Absolute 
Notion—the thought of thought that overcomes all opposition. Hegel’s 
Science of Logic is a unique science for this reason because it does not 
separate form and content. Thinking is not the mere form of cognition, 
as if content (or matter) came from somewhere else. Thinking is not, in 
other words, some sort of empty, external vessel that arrives at real or 
concrete material in order to fill itself up and become genuine knowing. 
On the contrary, as Hegel insists (crediting Plato and the Ancients): 
‘[T]the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone what is 
true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy but as first raised into 
the form of thought, as things thought.’20 What Hegel calls the ‘most 
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important proposition of philosophy’ is precisely the ideality of all finite 
entities or things.21
These Hegelian propositions here do necessarily entail hierarchy. 
Human cognition, for Hegel, is inescapably a higher stage than life, and 
the subject who can cognize the very terms of cognition itself vis-à-vis the 
natural or animal world is in fact the fulcrum of an egalitarian politics. 
The insights into animal or biological life that thinks such insights as 
thought—as determinations that are the essential nature of or an expression 
of logical kinship between thinking and objects—are truer than insights 
into, or practices of, animal or biological life that claim to have evaded 
thinking, or that emanate directly from everything that thinking is said 
to negate (e.g., the body, one’s animal urges, mere life, etc.). This is what 
Hegel means when he insists that the ‘[i]dea of life…remain enclosed 
within the form of the Notion’ and should not take its cue from actual 
forms of natural life itself.22
When we consider the conceptual or logical conditions that undergird 
our very cognizance of biological life, we can see that there is no getting 
intelligibly to the thing itself. The very words ‘biological’ or ‘natural life’ 
are, before they are anything else, abstract—an idea. Biological or natural 
life, in other words, has no intelligible meaning outside of, or prior to, 
the signifying act that conditions its emergence, and it is this signifying 
act that always already signals a primordial alienation from nature. 
Catherine Malabou beautifully distills the contours of this alienation 
when she invokes ‘signification’s impossible state of nature.’23 The politics 
that aims to reconcile signification and nature is one that ignores its own 
constitutive conditions.
In naming language as Sovereign, Agamben enables one to conclude 
that there is a sovereignty that is logical or Notional before it is historical, 
that there is a spoken bare life before someone is made into an exemplar of 
it. The first Sovereign decision, then, is an act of signification that cuts 
into undivided life, carving out a space for humans to speak and to 
understand themselves as temporal beings. When Agamben focuses 
directly on this structural dimension of Law, acknowledging its funda-
mental necessity, he appears to arrive at the vanishing point where 
Foucault’s analysis would seem to converge. Only it is not the vantage 
point at which normative or determinative power seals the deal, as it 
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were, through political techniques and the technology of subjectiviza-
tion. Sovereign power and subjectivization are part of the process; how-
ever, there is an unaccounted-for moment in this process that has nothing 
(and everything) to do with loosening the normative or totalizing hold of 
Law on life.
On the contrary, it is here that Agamben preserves and describes, with 
some inventiveness, the ontological status of, or role for, Law after its tie 
to normative or determinative Power has been severed. Alleging that 
there is ‘another use of law,’ Agamben coins a neologism of sorts (i.e., 
‘nonrelation’) to redeem the politics of this use. Rather than jettisoning 
Law altogether, Law and life remain joined, but it is a ‘nonrelation’ that 
names their connectedness. Law can maintain a ‘nonrelation to life’ and, 
in this way, avoid functioning as the Law that acts directly to determine 
or appropriate the lives, activities, and objects that make up a social 
world—or the ends to which they are directed and the definite relations 
that exist between them.24
The Law said to enjoy a ‘nonrelation to life’ is, Agamben contends, a 
‘pure law’—a law rid of commanding or even referential content and the 
ends and outcomes that legitimize it. What initiates the political or the 
human order of politics, for him, is a Law or linguistic entity that refers 
only to itself, or that is its own activity and nothing else. As Agamben 
puts it: ‘To a word that does not bind, that neither commands nor pro-
hibits anything, but says only itself, would correspond an action as pure 
means, which shows only itself, without any relation to an end.’25 This is 
how a Law becomes pure and an action genuinely political.
The more pure and purified Law becomes, of course, the more difficult 
it is to map its origins or to see how it might lead to an ‘ought’ capable of 
modifying animal or organic existence. Agamben’s forbearer here, in an 
unacknowledged way perhaps, is Kant, who sought out similar reasons to 
purify Reason; that is, not to restore or revalidate a dogmatism of proper 
objects, actions, and values, but to turn it, speculatively, back onto itself, 
to arrive at some conditions for cognition as such. Like Agamben’s pure 
Law, the pure Reason of the first Critique ‘is in fact occupied only with 
itself.’26 What Kant sees as a perversion of Reason is its exercise when 
determined by an intelligible end, when the chain of causality that deter-
mines an action is readily understandable—for example, I do not commit 
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adultery or speak ill of my parents because I have been commanded by 
God not to do so.
Kant’s separation of pure and ordinary Reason, his development of a 
doctrine and an analytic of ‘pure practical reason’ seeks precisely to rid 
human actions and values from their thralldom to the determinative Law 
of ends. We could say here that politics requires a Law separated from 
anything straightforwardly or materially relational—in the words of the 
second Critique ‘every object of the will (as its determining ground)’27—
so as to isolate and establish its purity. It is this pure aspect of Law that 
introduces a break into the ostensibly already-settled questions of why 
one should act this way and not that, of why these values are legitimate 
and those not, and so on. The fact that Law is severed from readily under-
stood notions of causality and legitimacy makes it something capable of 
catalyzing or reminding us of our freedom. As Kant puts it: ‘[A] will for 
which the mere lawgiving form of a maxim can alone serve as a law is a 
free will.’28 This ‘lawgiving’ form cannot be ‘reasoned out from anteced-
ent data of reason.’29 Good and evil come only after the Law because, 
otherwise, it would be the basis for that Law.
 Signification as Such
By theorizing Law in this way, Kant and Agamben confront us with (or 
get us to ask) a very basic question: How can we will something, or make 
decisions about the lives we life, undetermined by an intelligible or 
empirical Law? Who (or what part of the subject) would do this willing? 
In his famous reading of Freud’s ‘specimen dream’ (i.e., the dream of 
Irma’s injection) in Seminar II, Lacan seeks implicitly to address these 
questions by making more complex the commonplace notion that dreams 
are ‘the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes’30—the staging of illicit 
desires repressed for immoral or shameful reasons.
In the dream of Irma’s injection, Lacan sees something else going on, 
something much more formal or even philosophical. The key moment of 
the dream, of course, is the emergence of the formula for trimethyl-
amine—a signifying activity that prevents the subject or agent in the 
dream (Freud) from merging directly and chaotically with life (down the 
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throat of Irma). Lacan writes: ‘[J]ust when the world of the dreamer is 
plunged into the greatest imaginary chaos, discourse [as such] enters into 
play.’31 The formula for trimethylamine appears and, at this point, we 
have, says Lacan, reached the crux of the dream’s message, which is noth-
ing less than the very nature of the symbolic order: ‘[T]here is no other 
word of the dream than the very nature of the symbolic.’32 The word 
passed in the dream is ‘a word [that] means nothing except that it is a 
word’33; and this, ultimately, is the formal truth—‘the quest for significa-
tion as such’34—that Lacan discerns beneath Freud’s dictum that the sce-
narios we encounter in our dreams are fulfillments of a wish. That is to 
say, the deepest wish fulfilled in a dream is the wish to ‘pass a certain 
word.’35
This word (and this signifying activity) emerges, quite obviously, 
from the Unconscious—something logically grasped through its articu-
lations. I am tempted to say here that if there is a political link between 
Agamben and psychoanalysis on the question of the nonhuman, it rests 
in the claim that the Unconscious, too, has a ‘nonrelation’ to life. Which 
is to say that psychoanalysis, in its insistence on the centrality of the 
unconscious, cannot but find or delineate a type of nonhuman reality 
marked by entities that do not simply represent external things but 
rather what Jean Laplanche calls ‘designified-signifiers’.36 Laplanche’s 
invocation of such signifiers comes in an explicit homage to Lacan, 
wherein he notes the extent to which passage to the Unconscious is cor-
relative with a loss of referentiality. When a Signifier becomes uncon-
scious, Laplanche suggests, it ‘loses its status as presentation (as signifier) 
in order to become a thing which no longer presents (signifies) any-
thing other than itself.’37
What should become clear here is the extent to which, for Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and for Agamben, the human does inexorably maintain a 
speculative or logically necessary primacy over the nonhuman. Rather 
than signaling a worrisome recipe for domination, hierarchy, and con-
flict, the terms and implications of this primacy are the very conditions 
for politics and a shared world. For both Lacan and Agamben, language 
is always more than a tool and is used by human beings in ways that are 
different from other living things. This is because living human beings, 
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in ways they are barely cognizant of, enact the installation of the Signifier 
in every act of communication—meeting the very material of language 
as material and, in an instant, making it into something meaningful. 
Before the signifying message of a speech act is the ‘quest for significa-
tion itself,’ and the emergence of a word that wishes only to be a word. 
As Agamben correctly distinguishes it, this amounts to a dethroning of 
language:
It is perhaps time to call into question the prestige that language has 
enjoyed and continues to enjoy in our culture, as a tool of incomparable 
potency, efficacy, and beauty. And yet, considered in itself, it is no more 
beautiful than birdsong, no more efficacious than the signals insects 
exchange, no more powerful than the roar with which the lion asserts his 
dominion. The decisive element that confers on human language its pecu-
liar virtue is not the tool itself but the place it leaves to the speaker, in the 
fact that it prepares within itself a hollowed-out form that the speaker must 
always assume in order to speak—that is to say, in the ethical relation that 
is established between the speaker and his language. The human being is the 
living being that, in order to speak, must say ‘I,’ must ‘take the word,’ assume it 
and make it his own.38
The place in which the sovereignty of the Signifier leaves the speaker is a 
gap, a ‘hollowed-out’ place of fracture and lack.
Avowing the ‘peculiar virtue’ of human language—a virtue that makes 
speech acts fundamentally different from the song of birds, the buzzing of 
insects, the roar of lions—Agamben maintains the Law-executing func-
tion of the Signifier in the form of what he calls ‘gesture’ or an ‘event of 
language.’ What gesture communicates is communicability itself; it does 
not really say something meaningful because a gesture is, for Agamben, 
‘essentially always a gesture of not being able to figure something out in 
language.’39 As an event of language, a gesture performs or repeats what 
psychoanalysis understands as the installation of the Signifier—some-
thing that allows, as Agamben would put it, for the ‘factum of language 
and the factum of community to come to light for an instant.’40 This is an 
instant, of course, that forever renders impossible an organic link between 
the Signifier and a national language or state territory.
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 Poetry from Guantánamo
To exemplify the basic argument that has been made to this point—that 
the most authentic and inclusive human community is founded constitu-
tively on the sovereignty of the Signifier—let us now turn to one of the 
more surprising (and remarkably titled) literary works to be published in 
the last decade: Poems from Guantánamo: The Detainees Speak. There is, of 
course, much that is disquietingly poignant about the content of the 
poems that comprise the collection. The poems contain some singular 
declarations of humiliation and homesickness, despair and sorrow. Many 
speak directly about having been tortured, about indignities endured 
during capture and detention (e.g., shackling, not being permitted to 
void, etc.), and about the absence of loved ones (e.g., parents, spouses, 
children, etc.). Many of them make desperate appeals to God or to ordi-
nary Americans for freedom and justice.
The very circumstances surrounding the poems’ composition, too, 
are striking. As is well known, detainees were not given the materials 
necessary for written discourse (e.g., pen, paper, etc.): ‘Undeterred, 
some would draft short poems on Styrofoam cups they had retrieved 
from their lunch and dinner trays. Lacking writing instruments, they 
would inscribe their words with pebbles or trace out letters with small 
dabs of toothpaste, then pass the “cup poems” from cell to cell.’41 Giving 
voice to unspeakable suffering and longing, the poems stand alongside 
the hunger strike as the only forms of rebuke against the Sovereign 
decree that consigns the prisoner-authors to the state of exception and 
seeks to reduce their existence to the solitary and animal dimensions of 
biological life.
What is most salient about these acts of communication, however, is 
that they take the form of lyric poems, that when ‘the detainees speak,’ 
they speak in poetry. This is significant, I think, because lyric poems are 
unique speech acts that sit astride the threshold that clarifies the human–
nonhuman divide. Lyric poems shine a light on this threshold by refusing 
to conceal entirely the materiality of sound and word that is deployed, 
manipulated, and aurally or visually arranged. Poems are something quite 
different from a technical manual, a news report, or most plot-driven 
narrative prose. These latter forms already assume our status as speaking 
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beings and are thus uninterested in restaging the ontological conditions 
by which we emerge as creatures of language.
Even as lyric poems foreground their materiality, however, they main-
tain some tie to meaningful communication, refusing a devolution into 
babble or nonsense. Versification here has a politics with coordinates in 
the sovereignty of the Signifier and in the way it enables one to symbolize 
the material dimension of life—and is itself a material dimension of 
life—in the very act of negating it. We might say here, in fact, that it is 
the Sovereign exercise of the Signifier that creates the very space for poetry, 
for a pure means of communication that is, momentarily, its own end.
To return to Agamben’s terms, poetry shows us the pure Law qua sov-
ereign Signifier. Poetry enacts this law’s (or this signifier’s) nonrelation to 
life because what we meet with in poems is the process by which words 
do not naturally correspond to or determine aspects of life so much as 
make possible a variety of subsequent correspondences or determinations. 
Against the Law that does seek to determine and secure life, against those 
sovereignly signifying acts that name and relegate ‘enemy combatants’ in 
‘the War on Terror’ to the category of the nonhuman, poems remind one 
of the sovereignty that is necessarily antecedent to such an act. This is the 
sovereignty that is the condition for politics.
It is telling, in this context, that the Pentagon deemed the detainees’ 
poems a security risk, believing them to contain and transmit secret mes-
sages. For the Sovereign guardians of security, poems are no different 
from other instrumental forms of communication; everything about 
them is tied to their end, their hidden or concealed messages. But this is 
precisely to miss what is so significant about lyric poems, the way their 
power lies not in (the illusion of ) depth or secrecy they contain but rather 
what happens, in a very elementary way, on their surface. We might 
remember here Martin Heidegger’s claim that poems are not like pieces 
of  equipment in which language is used or used up, in which language 
‘disappears into usefulness.’42
The distinction Heidegger introduces between ‘projective saying’ and 
‘actual language’ is apposite here. Actual language preserves a world of 
closed (or settled) meanings. For instance, the Arab-Other is the ‘enemy 
combatant’ who seeks, by way of terroristic acts of violence, to destroy us 
and our way of life. The Other is the barbaric animal who must either 
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become a friend or be destroyed altogether. Projective saying, however, is 
what ‘prepar[es] the sayable’; it ‘simultaneously brings the unsayable as 
such into a world.’43
Consider the enjambment that distinguishes the second and sixth stan-
zas of Abdullah Thani Faris Al Anazi’s poem, ‘To My Father.’ In the first 
stanza, the poem’s speaker names the anguished homesickness he experi-
ences, having been incarcerated at Guantánamo for two years. The poem 
conveys just what the speaker is separated from—from the traditional 
application of kohl to the eyes, from fields of ‘lavender cotton,’ and from 
the togetherness of time spent in the homes of family members. Al Anazi’s 
poem contains a directive, and he imagines it reaching its intended audi-
ence and producing a gesture by proxy, as it were. That gesture is a kiss of 
the speaker’s father’s forehead: ‘Kiss him on the forehead, for he is my 
father/Fate has divided us, like the parting of a parent from a/newborn.’
In the sixth stanza, the speaker’s address is directly to a God ‘who gov-
erns creation with providence’ and who is deservedly worshipped. To this 
God, Al Anazi addresses a kind of prayerful appeal: ‘Grant serenity to a 
heart that beats with oppression./And release this prisoner from the tight 
bonds of/confinement.’ Both stanzas end with single words—‘newborn’ 
and ‘confinement’—that have been separated from the poetic declara-
tions to which they belong. In meeting these single words on separate 
lines, we meet with the capacity of poems to signify the very act of 
signifying.
The single word reminds us, for an instant, that words are things before 
we are made to see, too, that words are always more than mere things. In 
this case, their arrangement on the page—or their separation by an extra 
breath from the words that precede them—enables one to reenact a 
movement from organic or animal life to the properly human world of 
language. The pure discernment of the word gives way, in an instant, to 
‘figuring out’ what the speech act seeks to convey—the pain of separation 
from loved ones and the barbarism of Guantánamo’s prison conditions.
The lesson of the poem—and perhaps of lyric poetry itself—is that the 
only way to oppose the outrage of a historically Sovereign power and its 
relegation of human beings to the category of the nonhuman is with 
sovereign Power itself or as such. From the historically created state of 
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